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DECISION DIVERSION IN DIVERSE TEAMS: FINDINGS FROM







Using qualitative data from a 5-year participant observation study conducted inside the
corporate board of a publicly-held company, we discovered what happened when team
composition changed to increase the diversity of perspectives and interests represented on
the team. Based on board meeting transcripts over the 5-year period, we observed that
a change in team composition was followed by a process we label decision diversion,
a dysfunctional process in which the team replaced its goal of effective task performance
with negotiating the interests of subgroup members. A key insight of our study is that this
process unfolded as teammembers attempted to engage in effective task-based information
analysis and decision-making. Our study suggests that the traditional assumptions un-
derlying the understanding of team compositionmay be insufficient.We provide alternative
explanations for the origins of the dynamics of decision diversion in teams.
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Editor’s Comment
In their search for the microprocesses through which diverse team members interact
with one another, Harvey, Currall, and Hammer discover a process they call decision
diversion: the team’s replacement of its goal of effective task performance with negoti-
ating the interests of subgroup members. This discovery emerges from the in-depth,
longitudinal study of the meetings of a corporate board. Quoting one of the referees, “the
interesting insight is that increases in the diversity of perspectives and interests repre-
sented on the board required processing and integrating large amounts of complex in-
formation which the board failed to do, resulting in decision diversion.” This finding
challenges some established assumptions, and its implications for our understanding of
team composition suggest new questions for research on team diversity.
Africa Arino, Action Editor
Composing teams such that members represent
diverse perspectives and interests is onemechanism
recommended for improving decision-making in
boards of directors (Forbes&Milliken, 1999;Hambrick
& Mason, 1984), top management teams (Bantel &
Jackson, 1989; Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999), new
product development teams (Ancona & Caldwell,
1992; Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001), sales
teams (Jackson & Joshi, 2004), and a variety of other
work teams. To follow research advice to diversify
teams to improve decision-making and performance,
managersmayneed toalter teamcomposition.Todate,
however, research has primarily treated diversity as
a fixed input to team decision-making and overlooked
the microprocesses that occur after a change in
composition (Choi & Thompson, 2005; Levine, Choi,
& Moreland, 2003; Lewis, Belliveau, Herndon, &
Keller, 2007; Srikanth, Harvey, & Peterson, 2016; van
der Vegt, Bunderson, & Kuipers, 2010).
That oversight is both theoretically and practically
important. Theoretically, it is important to examine
the team dynamics that occur after a change in com-
position because empirical findings on the benefits of
diversity have been inconsistent (van Knippenberg &
Schippers, 2007). Diverse teams often fail to reach
their potential (Mannix &Neale, 2005). Literature has
portrayed poor performance in diverse teams as
resulting from conflict between team members and
a lack of task-focused communication that develop
quickly after team formation (van Knippenberg &
Schippers, 2007; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Teams
are only expected to reap the informational benefits of
diversity if they can overcome those interpersonal
challenges.However, research tends to examinemore
generalized constructs after teams have interacted for
some time (Srikanth et al., 2016). It is possible that the
microprocesses thatproduceeffects in the longer term
are not always those that are hypothesized in the
literature. Specifically, some research suggests that
processing a diversity of information may create
short-term cognitive challenges that limit team effec-
tiveness in the longer term (e.g., Cronin & Weingart,
2007;Dahlin,Weingart, &Hinds, 2005). Research into
the microprocesses that follow a change in team
composition is necessary to understand how the ef-
fects of diversity unfold over time.
Practically, in the pursuit of task performance,
managers must often add new members to a team to
deal with an increased workload, to access task-
relevant skills and resources, or to adjust to changing
task demands, or remove or replace poorly performing
members (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Hambrick & D’Aveni,
1992; van der Vegt et al., 2010). Research suggests that
team turnover typically disrupts team performance
(Levine et al., 2003), challenging managers’ ability to
use that intervention fruitfully. Moreover, when teams
change composition, they are likely to draw on new
members from a different social entity (e.g., a dif-
ferent team, functional specialty, or organization)
who represent a particular knowledge base or
interest group. Those newmembers often provide
an opportunity for subgroups to form that can ex-
acerbate the effects of diversity (Carton&Cummings,
2012; Li & Hambrick, 2005).
Our study of a decision-making team—a corporate
board of directors—over a 5-year period directly ex-
amined the dynamics that followed three changes in
team composition. A corporate board is an appealing
context for examining how changes in composition
affect processes in diverse teams. Research on cor-
porate boards recognizes that in some ways, boards
function like other small groups (e.g. Tuggle,
Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010). Two features of boards,
however, enable that context to provide new insights
into the dynamics of changing teamcomposition. One
feature is that board composition often changes to
improve performance if a firm is facing serious finan-
cial challenges (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988), as did
the board in our study. A second feature is that
board members may be chosen to represent different
sub groups (Eisenhardt, 1989a), creating a complex
subgroup structure in which coalitions representing
Author’s voice:
How and why did you get involved
in this project?
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diverse interests must negotiate outcomes (Cyert &
March, 1963). These features mean that boards re-
peatedly struggle with a heterogeneity of viewpoints,
bringing team dynamics to the surface in ways that
examining teams in laboratory and other small group
settings may not (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
Despite changing the composition of the board in
the ways prescribed by the literature, the firm we
studied went bankrupt after 5 years. We further ob-
served, however, that the board’s decision-making
difficulty could not easily be attributed to the dys-
functional dynamics that the literature has histori-
cally used to characterize diverse groups. Instead, we
discovered an alternate process thatwe labeldecision
diversion. Decision diversion is a pattern of team in-
teraction in which changes in team composition set
into action informational and status dynamics that
gradually shifted the team’s goals away from task-
based information analysis focused on advancing the
survival of the firm and toward negotiating the in-
terests of subgroupmembers. At the heart of that shift
was the obstacle that changes in composition created
to the board, who then faced the challenge of assimi-
latingand integrating awidediversityof opinionsand
information. When the board was unable to effec-
tively process an increasingly wide variety of per-
spectives and information, their attention became
diverted to solvingproblems thatweremore tractable,
but often less important.
The process of decision diversion shares com-
monalities with concepts investigated in previous
research, such as information overload (Miller, 1956;
O’Reilly, 1980), satisficing (Cyert & March, 1963;
Simon, 1957), goal displacement (Kerr, 1975;Merton,
1957), conflict, and coalition formation (March,
1962). What was surprising was not that any of those
concepts occurred in the boardwe studied, but rather
a) that they occurred in response to changes in team
composition that were aimed at improving decision-
making and b) the precise processes through which
theywere ordered. Specifically, during the process of
decision diversion, dysfunctional social processes
emerged over time because of the failure of decision-
making. Complexity of information and decisions in
the context of financial crisiswere the primary source
of the team’s difficulty. Ironically, attempting to un-
derstand and satisfy various subgroups enabled
subgroup-based negotiating to take place and in-
terfere with effective decision-making.
To further explain the process through which
changing team composition was associated with
decision diversion in the board of directors in our
study, we present qualitative process analyses of
team interactions that occurred inside the board-
room. We examined how changes in composition
affected boardroom discussions by studying the
board interactions leading up to board decisions.
Specifically, we compared boardroom interactions
and associated decisions that occurred following
a change in composition with boardroom interac-
tions that occurred after a period of interactionwhen
board composition was relatively stable.
CHANGING TEAM COMPOSITION
Afoundational idea forunderstanding teamdiversity
and team turnover is that changing team composition
may interfere with interpersonal interactions between
team members, but can aid team decision-making by
improving the team’s informational processes (Mannix
&Neale, 2005;Milliken&Martins, 1996; Srikanthet al.,
2016; vanKnippenberg &Schippers, 2007). Examining
research on team diversity, subgroups, and team
turnover reveals three implications of this model for
understanding how a change in team composition
may influence team dynamics and decision-making.
Some evidence, however, also reveals that each ex-
pectation may be oversimplified.
The first implication is that interpersonal and
subgroup dynamics are at the root of the difficulty
that faces diverse teams. Diversity can inhibit the
development of effective interpersonal relationships
between teammembers (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998).
Individuals tend to identify with similar others and
to communicate less with, have less trust in, and
have more conflict with those who are dissimilar to
themselves (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Tajfel & Turner,
1979). Distinct, internally homogeneous subgroups
can emerge when team members differ from one
another on multiple demographic characteristics
(Lau & Murnighan, 1998), when team members act as
representatives of different social entities such as job
functions or departments (Li & Hambrick, 2005), or
when team members have different bases of knowl-
edge and information (Carton & Cummings, 2012).
Dysfunctional interpersonal processes are expected to
emerge relatively early after group formation and to
subsequently disrupt a team’s information processing
(van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). Thus,
when new members are brought onto the team pre-
cisely because they represent a different set of skills,
interests, or information than those currently on the
team, subgroups may form, providing the team with
a broader base of knowledge for decision-making
(Bezrukova, Jehn, Zanutto, & Thatcher, 2009).
Author’s voice:
What was the most difficult or
challenging aspect of this research
project and paper?
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However, emerging research challenges this view. It
suggests that differences in social categories between
team members can improve team decision making by
signaling to team members to expect differences in
information and interests, helping them to uncover and
use members’ unique information in the short term
(Loyd,Wang, Phillips, & Lount, 2013; Phillips,Mannix,
Neale, & Gruenfeld, 2004; Rink & Ellemers, 2006).
The second implication is that access to a diverse
range of perspectives and information is the key
benefit of diversity. Research on team composition
suggests that diverse groups, particularly those with
deep level differences in knowledge andperspectives,
engage in more rigorous and thorough discussion
and debate (Milliken & Martins, 1996). Exposure to
a new perspective improves creativity and decision-
making (Loyd et al., 2013; Nemeth, 1986), which
can lead to increased task conflict (Simons et al.,
1999) and information elaboration (van Knippenberg
et al., 2004) in diverse teams. New team members
have the potential to bring new knowledge, ideas, or
interests to the team (Choi & Thompson, 2005). The
presence of moderate faultlines between subgroups
has been found to improve team performance by
surfacingdifferencesbetween teammembers (Gibson&
Vermeulen, 2003; Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003).
At the same time, diversity in information can be
difficult for teams to coordinate in the short term
(Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Dahlin et al., 2005), chal-
lenging the notion that access to more diverse infor-
mationwill necessarily improve decision-making. For
example, access to a broad range of information can
lead to information overload (O’Reilly, 1980) and be
difficult for teams to effectively integrate and synthesize
(Harvey, 2013).
The third implication is that teamscanovercome the
challenge of diversity when they attempt to uncover,
understand, and integrate one another’s perspectives
(Ely&Thomas,2001).Oneapproach toovercoming the
challenges posed by diversity taken in previous re-
search has been to identify moderators, such as team
identification, team culture, and cooperative norms
that enable teams to build stronger interpersonal
relationships (Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Earley &
Mosakowski, 2000; van der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005;
seeMannix &Neale, 2005 for a review). The negative
effects of subgroups can be reduced by strengthening
the interpersonal relationships between members of
the subgroups (Bezrukova et al., 2009). However,
those processes may also dampen the benefit of in-
formational diversity. When newcomers join a group
theyare likely to feel pressure to integrate into the team
by building positive interpersonal relations with other
teammembers (Rink & Ellemers, 2009). The desire for
positive interpersonal relations may cause new mem-
bers’ opinions and ideas to converge with those of
the team (Levineet al., 2003).Alternatively, rather than
integration, attempting to value all team members’
perspectives may lead to compromise or satisficing.
In sum, theremay be reason to question themodel
that changing team composition may interfere with
interpersonal interactions between team members,
but can aid team decision-making by improving
the team’s informational processes. Little research,
however, has empirically examined the mirco-
processes through which diverse team members
interact with one another. It is therefore unclear
how changing the composition of a team will in-
fluence interactions between team members upon
the team’s recomposition.
In the present research, we ask how changing
team composition affects team dynamics and
decision-making processes. To address that ques-
tion,we examine team interactions after changes in
team composition using data from a 5-year study of
a board of directors as the empirical setting. We
draw on qualitative methods, which “are especially
useful for surfacing new phenomena” (Ariño, Le
Baron, &Milliken, 2016), and therefore appropriate
for analyzingpreviouslyunexaminedmicroprocesses
in diverse teams.
THE TEAM IN OUR STUDY: THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS
Our study of how changing team composition
affects team dynamics and decision-making is
based on participant observer data collected from
the board of directors of a large nationally known
U.S. meatpacking company. Table 1 highlights key
features of the board. During the period of our
study, the firm had annual sales of approximately
$425 million and employed 3,000 employees at its
headquarter facility in a Midwestern state and in
smaller facilities throughout the Midwest and
Southwest. At the beginning of our study, the firm
was experiencing significant financial distress
from declining competitiveness relative to other
meatpackers.
The board of directors is an ideal context for in-
vestigating our research question for two reasons.
First, boards are often reconstituted to improve firm
performance, for example, outside directors are often
brought onto boards to represent a broad array of
perspectives and interests and to increase the inde-
pendence of the board (Eisenhardt, 1989a) and board
Author’s voice:
How did you get access to the
research site and data?
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membership may change in response to poor per-
formance; somemembers of the boardmay become
scapegoats (Cameron, Whetten, & Kim, 1987),
whereas others may be brought in for their exper-
tise (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988). Within the liter-
ature on boards of directors, diversity is a major
topic of research (van der Walt & Ingley, 2003).
Mirroring the diversity literature more broadly, it
suggests that, whereas diversifying the board in-
creases access to varied information and perspec-
tives available for task performance, it can also
impair communication, cohesion, and trust among
board members (Tuggle et al., 2010). The results of
that literature find similarly ambiguous effects of
diversity. Boards that are diverse in terms of both
demographic characteristics (Miller & Triana,
2009) and independent outside directors (Dalton &
Dalton, 2011) have not been found to consistently
exhibit higher performance. Boards, therefore,
constitute an excellent context for examining our
research question.
Critical to our study was the ability to observe
changes in board composition. The firm’s board was
reconstituted to deal with financial distress by add-
ing 10 new directors to the previously six-member
board, and the board responded to the firm’s wors-
ening performance by replacing the CEO two times
during the 5-year period of our study. During the
second period, two of the original directors that
preceded our study left the board. During the third
period, one director was replaced with a new
employee director, and three additional employee
directors joined the board. These changes were
made specifically to bring new expertise onto the
board and resulted in heterogeneity of opinions
and information. This enabled us repeatedly to
observe patterns of interaction that followed
changes in board composition as the reconstituted
board dealt with a worsening financial situation
over three periods.
The second reason that the board provided an ex-
cellent setting for our research is that the board in our
study was positioned to exhibit both the informational
and interpersonal processes predicted by the extant
literature. The board could benefit from new informa-
tion and interests to improve performance in the face
of declining financial position. New members either
joined the board at the same time as others, so that
theywere able to draw on a subgroupwhen expressing
their opinion, or were high status boardmembers such
as the CEO, who were more likely to express their
views. At the same time, the board was likely to expe-
rience interpersonal conflict. Four subgroups consti-
tuted the board. The firm’s original six-person board
of directors included two factions: “management”
directors and original “outside” directors (i.e., di-
rectors not employed by the firm). Of the 10 new di-
rectors addedwhen the boardwas reconstituted, 7were
outside directors (we label these “ESOP directors” to
reflect the fact that they joined the board as a result of
an Employee Stock Ownership Plan). The other three
new directors were rank-and-file employees nominated
by the local union officers (“employee” directors).
Each subgroup was chosen at different points in
time to represent particular interests or sources of
knowledge. Furthermore, because two CEOs were
replaced during the period of our study, there was
the potential for subgroup status and power on the
board to shift over time.
To examine dynamics in the board, we followed
the approach of many organizational scholars by
presenting an in-depth, longitudinal case study to
allow us to develop new theoretical insights into
“situations with complex dynamics and context-
specificmeaning” (Cattani,Dunbar,&Shapira,2013:3)
and from longitudinal processes that are difficult to
achieve through other research methods (Hargadon &
Douglas, 2001). Examplesof this approachareAllison’s
(1971) classic book on decision-making, which fo-
cused on the historical case of the White House de-
liberations regarding the Cuban missile crisis and
Weick’s (1993) historical analysis of theMannGulch
fire disaster. We studied the dynamics of the board
using data collected over a 5-year period between
July 1980 and December 1985. Data collection began
at the point at which the board was reconstituted to
the new 16-member structure.
TABLE 1





Chairman separate from CEO.
Standing committees Audit committee.
Employee relations committee.
Executive compensation committee
added within 1 year of beginning of









Firm strategy To produce and sell high-quality, high-
margin processed meat across the
national market. Sales-focused
strategy with high reliance on
salesforce personnel. Unionized labor
force, as common in major meat-
packing firms.
Firm performance Worsening financial performance over
10 years preceding the study. Eroding
market share. Declining operational
efficiency relative to competing firms.
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Data and Methods
Wedrewonagroundedapproach (Glaser&Strauss,
1967; Suddaby, 2006) to examine how dynamics un-
folded in the board during the 5-year period.We used
a longitudinal, exploratory study (Eisenhardt, 1989b;
Yin, 2003), paralleling the approach of other re-
searchers who have explored how dynamic organi-
zational processes unfold over time with data from
participant observation (cf. Clark, Gioia, Ketchen, &
Thomas, 2010; Currall, Hammer, Baggett, & Doniger,
1999; Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Our study was
grounded in the data in two ways (Suddaby, 2006).
First, our approach involved theoretical sampling to
guide our choices about the unit of analysis and what
data to sample from the collecteddataset. Second, our
approach relied on constant comparison techniques
to identify important board interactions as the board
integrated multiple perspectives into decisions.
Data Sources and Collection
Participant observation.The primary data for the
study were the third author’s participant observer
notes (Evered & Louis, 1981) from 31 boardmeetings
held over a 5-year period. The author had been
elected to the board. There are three specific impli-
cations of the author’s involvement on the board for
our research approach. First, we did not enter the
field with our precise research question in mind.
Rather, the third author aimed to develop an un-
derstanding of both the firm’s difficulties and
boardroom dynamics more broadly. The changes
that unfolded during the period of study allowed us
to subsequently form and examine our research
questions. Second, the study constituted a form of
action research, in that the author was actively in-
tervening in an attempt to help the firm and its em-
ployees improve their financial position. This
further justified the researcher’s presence in the or-
ganization, given the dire consequences facing the
firm (Whyte, 1979). Deeper involvement also helped
the researcher to learn about and grasp the firm’s
issues (Whyte, 1979). Second, data were collected
through overt observation (e.g., Whyte, 1943, 1979).
All board members were aware that the research
was being conducted and could result in research
publication, and they agreed to participate. It was
also clear to board members that the participant
observer was taking notes to capture boardroom
interactions, although that elicited very little explicit
attention as most directors typically took notes dur-
ing meetings.
Meetings ranged in length from 3 hours to two
8-hourdays andoccurredonaverage, onceeveryother
month. The notes consisted of verbatim accounts
of board action and debate, including who spoke,
onwhat topic, andwhatwas said. The notes consisted
of 4,428 verbal behaviors by directors and visitors,
providing details about boardroom deliberations
throughout the period of our study (Glaser & Strauss,
1967). On the day following ameeting, the noteswere
dictated onto cassette tapes exactly as they appeared
in the field notes, and the tapes were then typed into
transcripts. The observer’s own arguments and activ-
ities as a member of the board were also meticulously
written down immediately following themeeting and
supplemented with official board minutes. When
meetings were especially complicated, with seri-
ous disagreements, vociferous debate, and several
directors speaking at once, the participant ob-
server supplemented the notes with copies of the
unedited board minutes received from the board
secretary, which were far more detailed than the
official minutes.
Our unusual access to direct participant observer
data provided us with deep understanding and
allowed us to develop insights into complex in-
teractions in the boardroom, informed by a funda-
mental understanding of the context. Focusing our
data collection on first-hand observations of verbal
behaviors, not retrospective accounts of what was
said during board meetings, enabled us to limit
the risk of mistaking participants’ retrospective
accounts for what was said by board members
(Van Maanen, 1979). As a three-person research
team,wewere able to triangulate among the authors’
interpretations of the data as they emerged over
time (Jick, 1979). This allowed us to address poten-
tial biases of the participant observer (Spradley,
1980). To do that, the first and second authors acted
as outside researchers, treating the participant ob-
server as one of many informants in the project
(Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994). Both of
the other authors independently read the entire set of
participant observer notes several times, developing
their own emerging understanding of the board. As
they began to identify key themes, the three authors
met to discuss those themes, challenging and
informing one another’s understanding and de-
veloping hypotheses that could be checkedwith the
data (Becker, 1958). Each of the nonparticipant au-
thors separately and independently conducted ini-
tial analyses on the data, refining those analyses
over time, and discussing emerging findings with
the participant observer and each other.
Author’s voice:
How did the paper evolve and
change as you worked on it?
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Archival data. In addition, we collected archival
data such as written correspondence among board
members (e.g., letters) and bankers and newspaper
clippings about the firm. The archival data provided
a secondary data source that added richness to the
context in which dynamics played out in the
boardroom and our understanding of the events and
decisions of the board.
Analysis
Our analysis proceeded in three stages. In the first
stage (I), we aimed to describe with precision what
happened in the boardroomby content analyzing the
meeting transcripts (Krippendorff, 1980). In the
second stage (II), we drew on the content analysis
from stage I to develop visual maps (Langley, 1999)
that illustrated the chronology and nature of board
member interaction over the course of each indi-
vidual meeting. We label these visual mapsmeeting
maps (Harvey & Kou, 2013). By comparing meeting
maps to identify key similarities and differences
(Miles &Huberman, 1984), we identified three stable
patterns of interaction, which we discuss in detail
later. In the third stage (III), we arranged the meeting
maps developed in stage II along a timeline (Miles &
Huberman, 1984). This allowed us to observe how
patterns of interaction responded to changes in
board composition and to replicate these patterns
across three time periods. We describe each stage of
analysis in detail below.
Our primary unit of analysis is the boardroom in-
teraction preceding a specific board decision (e.g.,
a board vote). On average, the board made six de-
cisions per meeting. To assess those interactions, we
initially focused on individual boardmember verbal
behaviors. Subsequently, we examined how those
behaviors aggregated into board interactions. Fi-
nally, we used those units to compare interactions
that occurred immediately after changes in board
composition with interactions that occurred when
the board composition was stable.
Stage I: Content analysis. In the first stage, we
performed content analysis on our field notes
(Currall et al., 1999). That involved separating the
verbal behaviors by board members into units and
assigning verbal behaviors to the coding cate-
gories (see Guetzkow, 1950; Krippendorff, 1980).
We coded directors’ verbal behaviors on three di-
mensions: by individual, by topic, and by type of
verbal contribution (e.g., statement, question, or
argument). Types of verbal contributions included
seeking information and making nonpersonal ar-
guments in support of a position. Topics discussed
on the board included marketing and sales pro-
jections and salesforce issues, the firm’s financial
Example of a Meeting Map 
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performance, and union negotiations. In addition,
each verbal behavior in the field noteswas captured
so that the order inwhich verbal behaviors occurred
in the boardroom was preserved.
The content analysis began immediately after the
participant observation period concluded. Begin-
ning with a small set of verbal behavior categories
based on our knowledge of the board, the partici-
pant observer (coder 1) and the second author
(coder 2) selected board meetings at random and
coded them, progressively expanding the cod-
ing categories when it became clear that verbal
behaviors did not fit initial definitions of coding
categories. Through this iterative process, we de-
veloped precise definitional boundaries among
coding categories. Fifteen iterations were necessary
before we had an exhaustive and mutually exclu-
sive scheme for coding verbal behavior. To ensure
that the first order codes were trustworthy (Lincoln
& Guba, 1985), we conducted rigorous tests of re-
liability. A graduate student with no experience
either of the research site or of the development of
the coding scheme independently coded three
randomly selected meetings (coder 3). Interrater
reliability estimates, computed with Scott’s p
(Scott, 1955), for coders 1 versus 2 were .78 for
topics and .77 for verbal contributions. The esti-
mates of agreement between coder 3 versus coders 1
and 2 working jointly were .73 for topic and .77 for
verbal contributions, indicating acceptable re-
liability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The coding
categories are presented in the left-hand column of
Appendix A.
Once the first order codes had been developed, we
grouped the codes into more abstract theoretically
meaningful themes (also illustrated in Appendix A).
This entailed a process of iterating between the
content analysis data, our emerging interpretations,
and theory until a stable set of categories remained
that mutually, exclusively, and comprehensively
described the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967;Miles &
Huberman, 1984).
Stage II: Developing meeting maps. After we
established the comprehensiveness and reliability of
our framework for describing the activities of board
members, the next step was to examine the chro-
nology of those behaviors within single meetings to
understand team interactions. The appropriate re-
search strategy for this is “qualitative process
analysis” (Langley, 1999). We used the coding de-
veloped in stage I to provide a visual map of the
chronology of group interactions over the course of
meetings (see Harvey & Kou, 2013 for a similar
approach).
We then looked for commonalities across the
meeting maps to identify similar board interactions
and compare them with different interactions. We
closely examined each meeting map to identify pat-
terns of interacting. We observed that similar verbal
behaviors (e.g., asking and answering questions with
objective information, which were both related to ob-
jective task information exchange) frequently clus-
tered together. Therefore, when we observed a group
of similarverbalbehaviors,wemoreclosely examined
the nature of discussion for key characteristics to de-
scribe the exchange, iterating with theory to un-
derstand the most relevant dimensions for explaining
boardroom dynamics. We identified patterns of in-
teraction and compared the emerging patterns with
newly examined data as we went through subsequent
meeting maps (Miles & Huberman, 1984). This itera-
tive process resulted in a stable set of three patterns of
group interaction, which allowed us to compare in-
stances where groups interacted in one pattern to in-
stances where they interacted in a different pattern.
Stage III: Examining meeting maps over time.
Given thatwewanted tocompareperiods immediately
after the board had been reconstituted with periods
when the team structure was more stable, we exam-
ined how team interactions changed depending on
time period. We constructed a timeline (Miles &
Huberman, 1984; Pentland, 1999) to identify times
whenboardcompositionchanged.Thosepoints served
asopportunities to temporallybracket (Langley, 1999)
sets of interactions.
Three significant changes that occurred in board
composition provided practically and theoretically
relevant points at which to bracket temporal periods
because they represented times at which the board
composition changed, and therefore the board was
injected with new perspectives, and the power
structure of the board was in flux. This allowed us to
replicate (Yin, 2003) the patterns of interaction that
followed changes in composition of the board during
three periods. Specifically, we compared the pat-
terns of interaction leading to board decisions at the
beginning of a period in which the board composi-
tion changed with the patterns leading to decisions
after the board had been working together for some
time. Periods of stability that emerged when the
board had beenworking together for some timewere
determined by a shift in the nature of interactions
that we observed. That is, we did not a priori identify
time periods during which we expected board dy-
namics to be in flux after a change in composition;
Author’s voice:
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challenging aspect of this research
project and paper?
2017 365Harvey, Currall, and Hammer
instead, we were guided by the data in identifying
periods of change versus stability in composition.
Specifically, for meetings in the middle of a time
period, we examined whether the dynamics most
closely matched those of early stage meetings (pe-
riods of change) or later stage meetings (periods of
stability).
OVERVIEW OF DYNAMICS IN
THE BOARDROOM
Observation of the board suggested that changes
occurred to dynamics in the boardroom after
changes in board composition. Below, we provide
an overview of those dynamics in each of the three
time periods we identified in our analysis. We then
elaborate three types of team interactions that
emerged in the boardroom, and after that, we de-
scribe how those interactions evolved over time in
a systematic way.
The first period began when board composition
changed to include new outside directors at the be-
ginning of our study, creating four subgroups on the
board. Before that, the board had been closed to
scrutiny and was, according to the vice president of
sales, a “rubber stamp” board. After the initial
change in composition, the ESOP and worker di-
rectors began to question management policies and
actions openly. This process surfaced new in-
formation, ideas, and perspectives. Reports at the
beginning of each meeting were frequently inter-
rupted by questions and commentaries (about hog
supply, reasons for poor labor productivity figures
on specific production lines, points of clarification,
and so forth). That discussion was critical to helping
the new directors understand the firm’s core busi-
ness and the source of the firm’s financial distress.
Interestingly, despite the time and effort needed to
explain key issues to new directors, and for new di-
rectors to process that information, important de-
cisions about financing and the scope, powers, and
constitution of the board were made relatively effi-
ciently at first.
Over time, however, discussions became longer
and less likely to result in a decision. The average
number of decisions dropped from eight permeeting
during early meetings to four per meeting during
later meetings. The deliberations were a new expe-
rience for the six original board members, who
complained that meetings were longer than they
used to be, more frustrating for management, and
more turbulent. In addition, leadership emerged as
an important factor in that dynamic. The chairmanof
the board demonstrated a preference for consensus
decision-making and chose, on a few occasions, to
postpone decisions that threatened to be conten-
tious, saying that he wanted to give the directors
more time to consider the issue. Diversity in board
members’ interests became increasingly apparent
during this time, and boardroom dynamics shifted
towarddiscussions of those interests. Effectively, the
heterogeneity of opinions and perspectives became
an obstacle to task-focused decision making.
Thearrival ofCEO2constituteda secondchange in
board composition that marked the beginning of the
second period in our study. Although the change
involved only one new board member, it was sig-
nificant because the CEO, of course, had substantial
influence over board deliberations and that shift in
control meant that each individual board member’s
status on the boardwasmalleable. In addition, CEO2
was hired from outside of the board and the organi-
zation, so that existing board members had not
established a relationship with CEO2 before his
tenure. Board interactions followed a similar pattern
following CEO2’s arrival as during the first period
of our study. Initially, discussions were relatively
impartial and focused on expanding board mem-
bers’ understanding of the firm’s performance. De-
cisions dealt with positive improvements as part of
a survival plan for the firm, such as ways to im-
prove productivity.
Over time, however, discussions became more
protracted and less likely to result in a decision, with
the average number of decisions per meeting drop-
ping slightly during this period. For example, during
one month, the firm sustained large losses, and the
board spent several hours discussing how tomanage
operations. At that point, board members became
frustratedwith their inefficiency and ineffectiveness
at improving the firm’s performance. The CEO ar-
gued that there were too many board meetings
(typically one per month) and too much shop-
floor participation. However, he was unable to stop
dysfunctional dynamics from surfacing in the
board. This marked the beginning of more frequent
subgroup arguments and decisions aimed at ap-
peasing subgroup interests. Several decisions that
were made this way subsequently resurfaced, and
the board ultimately unmade or reversed them. For
example, the boarddecidednot to transfer the firm’s
trademark in one meeting, but subsequently de-
cided to do so less than one year later.
The final period of our study was marked by the
beginning of CEO3’s tenure and included some ad-
ditional turnover that resulted in four new employee
Author’s voice:
Ws there anything that surprised
you about the findings? If so, what?
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directors. CEO3 was a board member before being
electedCEO.Weagain observed a rejuvenationof the
board’s focus on expanding the options to halt the
financial difficulties facing the firm. For example,
despite being a former head of the union, CEO3
expressed a strong interest in considering ways to
take an aggressive stand against the union to improve
the firm’s financial position. Over time, however,
those discussions too gave way to subgroup argu-
ments and interests and the number of decisions per
meeting dropped from seven to four.
We observed substantial consistency in the pat-
terns of interaction that followed a change in com-
position in each of the three periods. Initially, the
board would focus on the task of making decisions
to improve firm performance, but over time, dys-
functional interpersonal dynamics would emerge.
The chairman attempted to refocus the board. He
tried to control both the agenda and the meetings
with a firm hand. He told directors when to talk,
stopped them from interrupting the CEO’s pre-
sentations, and deflected criticisms of management
performance onto himself whenever possible. How-
ever, he was unable to prevent subgroup arguments
and negotiations or to redirect the board toward its
urgent and critical task.
Underlying those patterns were three interrelated
dynamics. First, the heterogeneity of opinions and
information of board members created an in-
formation overload on the board. Second, the firm’s
financial crisis exerted external pressure on the
board. Third, instability in the status hierarchy
emerged as new relationships were forged. These
dynamics shifted over time. In period 1, the in-
formation load was high as there were many new
memberswho brought new information to the board.
In period 2, CEO2 required substantial information
as he came from outside of the organization, but the
information requirements were less because he was
the sole new board member. In period 3, CEO3 was
a former board member and union president. He
therefore had lower information demands than
CEO2. There was some additional information load
because of the addition of four new employee
TABLE 2
Examples of Team Interactions in the Boardroom
Task-Based Information Analysis Conflict Sub-Group-Based Issue Negotiating
Discussion following an employee
director’s request for assistance from the
company’s pension and insurance
departments in filing a report and
performing his work as a trustee of the
ESOP:
Employee director: I don’t want to be
involved in something that is risky and
troublesome, and if I have to, I will
resign. [He goes on to say that he wants
the company to act as consultants and
make sure that the trustees do their work
correctly].
Chair: ‘Assist’ is the proper word. The
company can assist but the company
cannot be responsible for the trustee’s
actions. [TheChair then suggests that the
Employee director make some changes
in the motion to make the motion more
flexible.]
ESOP director: You have the power to
ask the company for help.
Employee director: I want an assurance
from theboard that Iwill get thehelp I am
entitled to.
Pre-ESOP director 1: You are probably
better off without my help [because it
should come from outside, rather than
the firm’s internal attorneys].
Pre-ESOP director 2: The best help
would probably be a pension consultant
from the outside.
Discussion about whether to remove the
$3,500 annual retainer paid to board
members:
ESOPdirector1. . .makes themotion that
the retainer be cut completely. . . ESOP
director 2 seconds themotion. Pre-ESOP
director 1 is the first one to argue against
it. In fact, Pre-ESOP director 1 argues
against it in absolutely shocked tones.He
is clearly very disturbed that we could
suggest that we remove the $3500 of his
compensation. Employee director 1 is
arguing against this is well. . . ESOP
director 2 gets very angry at Employee
director 1 and says “. . . he should be
willing to work for the board without
external compensation. . .” and that “. . .
nobody belittles the kind and amount of
work he does, it’s certainly
appreciated. . .but one should not, with
the company in such dire straits, take
any money that one could do without.”
Exchange about how to deal with the
firm’s pension liability:
Chair: Absolutely something has to be
done now [about terminating the
pension and the bankruptcy of the firm],
as quickly as possible because we are in
very bad shape, and ifwedonotmeet the
$5 million pension liability by
September, individual board members
will be personally liable.”
Unionpresident: I prefer 10-plus years to
pay it off. The union will not go along
with the freeze, they will force us into
bankruptcy to protect their own freeze
requirements from all other
employers. . .
Chair: What can you do? What can we
offer them?
Union president: I am convinced that we
cannot survive a freeze. It would be the
anchor around our neck. What are
people willing to accept?
Worker director: People are saying to me
that we aren’t up to the agreement if we
don’t have a pension.
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directors, although they joined an existing subgroup
on the board rather than offering a fundamentally
new perspective. The external pressure on the board
became more intense across the three periods as the
firm’s financial position worsened. The board ex-
perienced a surge of optimism with each change in
composition during which they perceived the crisis
as less severe, but they subsequently came to recog-
nize the firm’sworsening position.With each change
in composition, therefore, the degree of optimism
and the persistence of task-based information anal-
ysis lessened. The extent of instability in the status
hierarchy lessened across the three periods. In
period 1, there were multiple new board members
between whom new relationships could form; in
period 2, there was one powerful outsider with
whom to build relationships; and in period 3,
there was one powerful insider, so that power
shifted on the board, but relationships had already
been established between the new CEO and board
members.
Below,wefirstdescribe theconsistencyweobserved
with each change in teamcomposition across the three
periods. We then describe how changes in the context
from period to period influenced these dynamics.
Team Interactions
The boardroom dynamics described previously
were characterized by three distinct types of in-
teraction. As predicted by the literatures on team
diversity, subgroups, and team turnover, we ob-
served two types of interactions that we label
task-based information analysis (which reflected in-
formational processes described in the teams litera-
ture) and conflict (which reflected the interpersonal
processes described in the teams literature). In addi-
tion, a third process that is not described in those lit-
eratures emerged, which we label subgroup-based
issue negotiating. We describe each pattern in detail
below. Table 2 provides examples of each approach.
Although the patterns represent clusters of similar
verbal behaviors (as described in Stage II of our
analysis), verbal behaviors from other categories
may occasionally punctuate those interactions. For
example, task-based information analysis is charac-
terized by information exchange verbal behaviors,
although one board member may make a single
comment characterized by conflict within an in-
formation analysis interaction. If other board mem-
bers ignored or diffused that comment and returned
to information exchange behaviors, the interaction
would be described as information analysis because
that was the primary pattern of verbal behavior that
occurred during the interaction. By contrast, if
boardmembers respondedwith other conflict verbal
behaviors, that would mark the beginning of an in-
teraction that fit the conflict pattern.
Task-Based Information Analysis
One form of team interaction was task-based in-
formation analysis. These interactions mirrored the
informational dynamics expected to arise from team
diversity and changes in team composition. During in-
formation analysis, board members exchanged and
interpreted information and broadened the discussion
to incorporate new factors and to introduce new pos-
siblecoursesofaction. Ingeneral, thiswasdonewithout
revealing personal agendas or interpersonal conflict.
When agendas or conflict did occur, the discussion
quicklymovedback to the task.Thispatternwas typical
during the beginning of each of the three periods we
studied. Forty-eight percent of boardroom interactions
were described as task-based information analysis.
The discussion in the left-hand panel of Table 2 il-
lustrates task-based information analysis dynamics.
In this exchange, board members offered their per-
spectives to expand the options available for meeting
anemployeedirector’s interests.Their ideaswerealso
beneficial for the firm because they aimed to protect
the firm fromestablishing an inappropriate relationship
with the employee director. The interaction helped the
board to explore potential solutions to the problem
raised by the employee director. Most information
analysis discussions were complex and involved a
significant amount of information exchange, in par-
ticular, probing for new information to build board
members’ understanding. For example, in one dis-
cussion, a pre-ESOP director requested a profit-and-
loss statement for each product so that the board
could understand the firm’s financial issues. In re-
sponse to his questions about how the hog-hedging
operation affect the profitability of the business and
whether hedging was worth the $3 million of firm
money tied up in the operation, the CEO described
how hedging was used across the industry, and the
union president (a visitor to the board) explained
how hedging had become a problem due to a de-
crease in international demand for surplus meat,
which now had to be sold at a loss. The pre-ESOP
director continued to probe into this issue with var-
ious board members, expanding the board’s un-
derstanding of the issue. Building that knowledge
opened up the options available to the board, such as
allowing the board to consider whether to use the
hedging operation at all.
Other types of verbal behaviors occasionally
punctuated discussion characterized by task-based
information analysis. For example, an individual
board member may react angrily to a question or
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suggestion. However, we observed that duringmany
discussions, those reactions would be quickly con-
tained and the board’s focus remained on the task
despite an occasional affective reaction.
Conflict. A second form of team interaction was
the affective, interpersonal conflict described in
previous literature as associatedwith diversity and
changes in team composition. These interactions
were characterized by negative interpersonal emo-
tions and the exchange of attacks and threats be-
tween board members. This pattern tended to occur
intermittently throughout the three periods in our
study. Thirteen percent of boardroom interactions
fell into this category.
The exchange described in the middle panel of
Table 2 illustrates the conflict process. During the
exchange, the outside directors directly chal-
lengedwhether the employee directorswere acting
in the best interests of the firm. Another employee
director emphasized the underlying negative
emotion brought out by this discussion when she
later commented:
I feel kindof separate from the rest of you [i.e., the
nonemployee directors on the board] as it is
anyway, and to remove my board fee would just
makeme feel that Iwas evenmore separated. . .. It
isn’t as if the company is wasting a lot of money
onme—it would cost them just about the same to
pay me my expenses and loss of earnings.
Because of the affectively charged nature of these
interactions, they tended to escalate. One discussion
about the firm’s financial standing, for example, be-
came highly contentious after emotional interjections
from a board member. When CEO2 indicated that, fi-
nancially, the firmmay have “. . . a pretty goodmonth;
we could even be flirting with a break-even situa-
tion,” one pre-ESOP outside director, a local banker,
responded: “Oh, youmean it will be a $2million loss
rather thana$3million loss?”DespiteCEO2’s attempts
toquell this conflict, others soonadoptedasimilar tone
and the discussion degenerated.
Subgroup-based issue negotiating. Whereas
task-based information analysis and conflict could
be predicted from the extant literatures, we observed
a third form of team interaction that emerged during
boardroom discussions, which we label subgroup-
based issuenegotiating.During these interactions, the
board developed negotiated agreements in response
tosubgroupinterests.Thesediscussionsweredominated
by arguments about the effects of alternative courses
of action on special interest subgroups in the firm
(e.g., employees, management, or the union), with
relatively little attention to empirical data or ob-
jective information regarding the financial health of
the firm. For example, executive directors tended
to attempt to protect managerial compensation,
whereas employee directors tended to attempt to
protect employee compensation. Subgroup-based
issue negotiating tended to occur midway through
FIGURE 1
Patterns of Interaction over Time
(1) Decisions that resulted from a mix of the three kinds of verbal behaviors were not classified into one type; in addition, total decisions include approving
minutes at the beginning of a meeting, which are not included in any of the percentages
= Period primarily characterized by Task-based Information Analysis
= Period primarily characterized by Sub-group-based Issue Negotiating 
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each of the three periods in our study. Twenty-one
percent of interactions fell into this category.
The exchange in the right-hand panel in Table 2
illustrates the issue negotiating approach. During
the discussion, the board attempted to determine
the best strategy for dealing with the pension lia-
bility by considering how individual board mem-
bers, the union, and employees would be affected
by, and react to, different strategies. The example
illustrates that board members attempted to gather
information on and understand one another’s per-
spectives during these discussions, such as when
the union president probed for information onwhat
the employees would accept. As opposed to focus-
ing on what might have been in the financial best
interests of the firm, however, the chair emphasized
resolving conflicting subgroup interests when he
asked, “What can we offer [the union]” in exchange
for going along with the strategy?” Interpersonal
conflict sometimes accompanied these discussions,
but that conflict was often quickly diffused. Where
it was not, negotiating discussions tended to be
followed by conflict.
Temporal Patterns of Boardroom Interactions
We further observed that the board engaged in
the three types of team interactions in a predict-
able pattern over time. Specifically, following a
change in composition, the board first engaged in
task-based information analysis then moved to
subgroup-based issue negotiation. The pattern is
illustrated in Figure 1. To describe that pattern, we
draw on two descriptive statistics from our fin-
dings—the percentage of interactions classified by
different types during early versus later stage
meetings after a change in board composition, and
the percentage of decisions preceded by a type of
interaction during early versus later stagemeetings.
In general, we observed that fewer interactionswere
classified as task-based information analysis and
more interactions were classified as subgroup-
based issue negotiating in later stage versus earlier
stage meetings after a change in composition (see
Figure 1). Importantly, we also observed that the
likelihood of a decision following information
analysis decreased during later stage meetings
compared with early stage meetings, and the like-
lihood of decisions following an issue negotiating
interaction increased during later stage compared
with early stage meetings (see Figure 1). We sug-
gest that those broad trends indicate a shift in the
basis on which board members were able to reach
consensus and therefore reflect a shift in the dy-
namics of the board, both in terms of decision-
making and interpersonal processes. We describe
the pattern in more detail across the three periods
below.
Following a change in composition, the board
oscillated between periods of task-based informa-
tion analysis and periods of subgroup-based issue
negotiating, with conflict occurring intermittently
throughout. This pattern suggests that initially, a
change in composition stimulated discussion of
the root causes of the firm’s difficulties and intro-
duced new options for the board to consider. At the
beginning of each period in Figure 1, boardroom
interactions were characterized primarily by task-
based information analysis. Importantly, the decisions
(i.e., votes) that were made during these periods fol-
lowed information analysis. Over time, however,
board interactions became dominated by subgroup
issue negotiating. Moreover, when those interests
were discussed, decisions appeared to become
easier for the board to reach. As Figure 1 illustrates,
toward the end of each period, decisions weremore
likely to be preceded by subgroup interest-based
negotiating than by information analysis. For in-
stance, in period 1, although only 33 percent of
boardroom deliberations involved subgroup-based
issue negotiating, those interactions preceded 55
percent of the decisionsmade, whereas information
analysis preceded only 10 percent of decisions.
Similarly, toward the end of period 2, issue negoti-
ating preceded 44 percent of decisions, and toward
the end of period 3, issue negotiating preceded
35 percent of decisions.
One of the board’s most significant early decisions
occurred in period 1 and relied on sub-group-based
issue negotiating. The stock ownership agreement
between the firm and its employees included the re-
placement of the CEO1. Although the CEO1 contin-
ued to run the firm for 9months after the ESOP began,
he knew he was only a caretaker and left the opera-
tionsof theboard to thechairman.Theboard therefore
had to select a new CEO. Only one candidate for the
position was seen as having a compelling plan for
turning the firmaround.Surprisingly,however, board
members objected to that candidate’s plan because of
the potential impact on various constituents (e.g., the
union). As a result, that candidate was not hired, and
a candidate who provided more of a compromise be-
tween conflicting subgroup interests became CEO2.
The financial positionof the firmcontinued toworsen
after CEO2 was hired.
Shifts from Task-based Information Analysis to
SubGroup-Based Issue Negotiating
To better understand why a pattern of shifting
from task-based information analysis to subgroup-
based issue negotiating may have occurred, we
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examined themeeting transcripts for those points at
which issue negotiating first became the dominant
form of interaction preceding board decisions. This
revealed that information analysis interactions
could lead the board to divert their discussion to-
ward issue negotiating.2 In particular, the board
displayed a tendency to delay decision-making on
some issues because they lacked an understanding
of the financial information necessary to reach
a decision. At that point, board members would
move the discussion forward by making arguments
for satisfying particular subgroup interests in the
absence of the ability to make a more objective, fi-
nancially focused decision.
An example of the shift from information analysis
to issue negotiating occurred during a meeting in
February 1982, part way through CEO2’s tenure.
That discussion began with task-based information
analysis when board members discussed whether
the firm should be shrinking its inventories. The
labor representative (the local union president,
a visitor to the board) commented that “. . .this is
a problem, becausewe can really do two things—we
can lay-off people and we can discount the price. If
we discount the price, we’re going to lose money; if
you lay off people, people are going to be upset.”
Various board members then probed to understand
the amount of inventory held by the firm and the
implication of reducing inventory for firm perfor-
mance. After the union president argued in favor of
buying inventory from other firms instead of con-
tinuing to run the “kill-line” (through which in-
ventory was produced), CEO2 commented that “. . .
we cannot do this too fast . . . we have so many
changes going on at once.” At that point, several
board members emphasized the simple need for
action, with the Labor Relations Officer concluding
that “. . .he doesn’t reallywant to stop the kill, but he
wants to do something.” Despite the fact that a de-
cision about the best option was never reached, the
discussion transitioned onto how to get the firm’s
employees and union to support board initiatives.
That discussion relied heavily on subgroup-based
issue negotiating, with different members drawing
on arguments in support of worker, union, and
management interest. At that point, the discussion
had been diverted away from the best course of ac-
tion for the firm and toward how to implement any
course of action, given theneed to do something and
the knowledge that all decisions would be difficult.
As a second example, the fourth meeting of the
reconstituted board and the point at which the pre-
dominant board dynamic began to shift from in-
formation analysis toward issue negotiating also
illustrates this pattern. During the discussion, the
board attempted to understand why the union was
upset about financial information they had received
from the board.3
ESOP director 1 brings up the question of what
happened to the $5million held in escrow. The VP
of Finance is calm and explains what happened in
clear, even language. . . ESOP director 1 then turns
to CEO1 and says there are a couple of things about
the figures that he does not understand. [An ex-
change about the figures follows between the VP
Finance, ESOP director 1, and ESOP director 2].
CEO1 does not respond [to ESOP director 1’s
questions]; the chair answers for him, and pre-
ESOP director 1 [a banker] chimes in from time to
time. . .. ESOP director 2 says “I would like to know
why the misunderstanding came about, and in
particular, why do I end up getting calls from the
union about this, when they should have gotten the
response straight from management?” CEO1 and
the VP of Sales and Marketing are both defensive
about this question; CEO1 stops speaking com-
pletely. ESOP director 1 says “What do you expect
these guys to believe if they can’t even understand
the figures you presented?” The chair turns to
ESOP director 1 and ESOP director 2 and takes full
blame for this misunderstanding, saying it was
probably the board’s fault or his fault and that he’s
sorry this happened. TheCEO continues to say that
the union got a full explanation of what happened
to the money that nothing was withheld from
them.
During this part of the exchange, the board inter-
action was characterized primarily by information
analysis. The board began by trying to understand
financial information that had been presented to the
union and the cause of the union’s confusion over
that information. The ESOPdirectors attempted to
expand the board’s perspective by reframing the
issue in terms of the union’s position and their
own involvement in resolving the issue. However,
the ESOP directors’ probing led management to
withhold information about the issue, and the
board chair to take responsibility for the problem
without the board really understanding its root
causes.
2 Engaging in conflict interactions could also produce
discomfort and make it difficult for the board to reach
a decision due to interpersonal conflict. We focus here on
the shift from information analysis to issue negotiating
because that was the primary pattern we observed in our
data, as illustrated in Figure 1.
3 Names of directors have replaced by descriptive role
positions
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Accepting responsibility had the unexpected ef-
fect of beginning to divert the board away from in-
formation analysis because no alternative solutions
could be identifiedwithout a deeper understanding
of the issue. Following the previous excerpt, ESOP
director 1 raised an issue about a change in how
pensioners were getting access to medical insurance.
ESOP director 1 indicated that this may not be an
appropriate issue for the board, noting that he
“. . .does not want to bring collective bargaining is-
sues to the board” and two of the other outside di-
rectors expressed similar concerns that the issue
was petty and should be dealt with bymanagement,
not the board. The board discussed the issue in
some depth despite that, with directors strongly
advocating for different interest groups (the union
versus management). Ultimately, the board re-
solved this issue when the chair asked the Labor
Relations Officer (a visitor to the board) to look into
getting help for the pensioners at a low cost. The
board’s attention was therefore diverted away from
a significant and complex problem with the union,
the resolution of which may have improved
management-labor relations. The board then dis-
cussed a more minor issue that did not require
a prolonged discussion of underlying causes and
detailed financial figures and was therefore easier
for the board to resolve.
In a third example, the chairman of the board in-
troduced an immediate need to make a decision
about the pension plan to comply with Internal
Revenue Service regulations. The firm lacked the
funds to make a necessary payment of $1.8M to the
IRS, but would need to make the payment or face
a further financial penalty or directors’ personal li-
ability for the payment. In considering a variety of
options, including whether to freeze or terminate
the pension plan, various board members advocated
specific ideas, but thediscussion subsequently turned
to what other concessions the firm could obtain from
workers, as a way to achieve better financing terms
and protection from creditors.
During this discussion, the union president (now
a member of the board) shifted the framing of the
discussion to the subgroup interests of the union.
He responded: “I prefer 10-plus years to pay it
[the money] off. The union will not go along with
the freeze. . .” The chair then asked “What can
you do? What can we offer them (the union)?”, and
the discussion moved toward how to satisfy the
union rather than how to deal with the pension
issue. Although one of the auditors eventually
took over to objectively discuss the benefits and
disadvantages of filing for Chapter 11, the board
as a whole never completely shifted back toward
the task. There was no clear resolution to the
discussion, with board members after the meeting
expressing different understandings of the best
way to deal with the situation, and having different
preferences for freezing the pensionplan, terminating
the pension plan, and filing for Chapter 11.
Effect of Underlying Dynamics on
Team Interactions
At the heart of those points at which board dis-
cussion diverted away from information toward
subgroup interestswere three interrelated dynamics.
First, the heterogeneity of opinion and information
created complexity that itself formed an obstacle to
effective task-focused decision making. In the first
example above, ESOP director 1 stated that there
were some figures he did not understand. In the
second example, CEO2 subsequently commented
that he could not understand why money had not
been moved from one bank charging a high interest
rate to another where it could be consolidated with
other firm funds, and ESOP director 2 noted that
she was “. . .so totally confused in terms of who
[one of the lenders] is that they seem like nothing
but a bunch of shysters.” Therefore, the board’s
difficulty understanding complex issues because
of the breadth of information available was asso-
ciated with boardroom deliberations shifting
away from those topics.
Second, the firm’s worsening financial position
further intensified the complexity created by the
information load. As the firm’s financial problems
became more urgent, the board came to realize that
they did not fully understand the nature of the
problems they were facing and felt under even
greater pressure to take immediate action to solve
those problems. Board discussions reflected the ex-
ternal pressure to act due to the firm’s financial po-
sition, such as when the Labor Relations Officer
indicated a desire “to do something,” as in the first
example above. Similarly, in the third example
above, therewas an urgent need to act on the pension
issue. When the board could not immediately re-
solve that issue, they turned to a subgoal that may
have helped them move toward resolving the pen-
sion problem—how to satisfy the union to allow
them to take action. Whereas the diversity of in-
formation and opinion shifted the board away from
complex financial issues, external pressure moved
the discussion toward a relatively simpler negotia-
tion of divergent interests.
Third, the instability of the status hierarchy after
a change in board composition emerged as an alter-
native basis for decision-making. During discussions,
a variety of positions were revealed that suggested
short-term subgoals on the path to improving
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financial performance that the board could pursue.
For instance, in the third example above, the union
president said that the union would not allow the
board to freeze the pension plan, so satisfying the
union became an alternative problem for the board to
solve. That was possible because of instability in the
status hierarchy—in this instance, the increasing in-
fluence of the union and workers. Furthermore, in-
stability in the status hierarchy contributed to the
difficulty of resolving the confusion created by the
information load. In attempts to retain or gain status,
board members engaged in conflict and influence
tactics such as stonewalling (i.e., refusing to answer
a direct question). For example, CEO1 frequently
refused to answer questions about the financial
position of the firm to avoid revealing his own role
in the firm’s financial situation, and CEO2 fre-
quently refused to answer questions about his plan
to save the firm to avoid revealing his lack of un-
derstanding of the full financial situation. Status
hierarchies can help teams to coordinate their be-
haviors (Halevy, Chou, & Galinsky, 2011). Without
a clear hierarchy, however, it may have been diffi-
cult for board members to compel or coerce one
another to share information.
The chairman of the board was unable to halt
the shift from information based discussions to
subgroup negotiations, despite attempts to direct
board discussion. One reason may be that the chair
had a preference for consensus and as a result often
accepted blame for problems. Ironically, that may
have prevented the board from getting to the root of
those problems and therefore from making de-
cisions on issues directly related to their core goals.
The chair’s drive for consensus may also have di-
rectly contributed to the board’s satisfaction with
resolving subordinate goals. In addition, the chair
employed a participative and distribute leadership
approach, giving substantial responsibility to other
board members. That may also have allowed board
members to surface their subgroup interests, cre-
ating the opportunity for interest-based negotiat-
ing. Therefore, although we do not suggest that
leadership created the dynamics we observed,
a more effective leadership style may have pre-
vented the shift from information to interest-based
negotiating.
Summary: Decision Diversion and
Team Performance
We summarize the process observed in the board
in Figure 2. We label it decision diversion, a process
throughwhich theboard gradually shifted their goals
FIGURE 2
Summary of the Process of Decision Diversion Observed Inside a Corporate Boardroom
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away from improving the financial performance of
the company over time. The process involves a pat-
tern of board deliberations shifting from information
analysis to subgroup issue negotiating, resulting in
a shift in the very goals the board was attempting to
pursue. Over time, decisions based on the board’s
fiduciary responsibility to the firmweredisplacedby
decisions based on the subgroup interests of board
members, which were seen as opportunities to
overcome obstacles on the path to improving the
firm’s financial performance. For example, instead
of attempting tomake a choice in the best interests of
the firm, the board may have chosen an alternative
that they knew would boost workforce morale in
exchange for employee cooperation with something
else.
Underlying this pattern was a confluence of in-
formational, status, and external dynamics.4 A key
insight is that this problem was intensified by the
board’s attempt to expand the discussion to in-
corporate new information and introduce alternative
courses of action through task-based information
analysis. That heterogeneity of opinion created an
obstacle. Information analysis highlighted the com-
plexity of the problems facing the board and may
have made the problems themselves appear in-
tractable. Coupledwith the heightened need tomake
a correct decision because of the importance of
strategic decisions for the firm’s financial viability,
new information, and alternative courses of action
made it difficult for the board to reach consensus.
Over time, information analysis gave way to de-
cisions that could be reached by negotiating various
subgroup interests. Those decisions were aimed at
satisfying fundamentally different goals than the
board’s core task of regaining financial stability.
Subgroup issue negotiating emerged as the team
members learned about, and came to understand,
one another’s goals and interests. The board chair
wasunable to refocus theboard’s attentionon its core
task.
We posit that decision diversion resulted in sub-
optimal decision-making because it typically in-
volved the discussion of issues that board members
themselves considered to be less important than the
firm’s survival, it occurred when board members
were confused and had difficulty reaching a de-
cision, and it was associated with the continued
worsening of the firm’s financial performance. We
further posit that decision diversion emerged from
changing team composition in an environment of
poor financial performance and that it contributed to
the firm’s worsening performance. This is because
financial distress brings the trade-off between de-
cision quality and decision-making efficiency into
sharp relief; when a firm faces financial distress, the
board’s decisions are critical for the firm’s survival
andmust be high in quality and the pressure tomake
those decisions is acute. The context prompts the
team to take action.
The process of decision diversion relates to, but
is distinct from, several concepts previously de-
scribed in organizational literature. Aswemayhave
expected, subgroups or factions (Carton&Cummings,
2012; Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Li & Hambrick, 2005)
developed in the board and board attention turned
toward negotiating the interests of those subgroups.
What was surprising was that subgroup dynamics
only came to dominate team interactions after the
failure of task-based information analysis. In the
short term, the team focused on task-based infor-
mation analysis, and conflict occurred infrequently
and in relative isolation. By contrast, the litera-
ture on diversity and subgroup dynamics suggests
that the interpersonal consequences of team
composition occur shortly after team formation
and focuses on avoiding or managing conflict as
necessary interventions in diverse teams (Li &
Hambrick, 2005; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999).
During the process of decision diversion, board
members reached the limit of their ability to pro-
cess all of the information relevant to a decision
(Cyert & March, 1963) and may well have experi-
enced information overload (O’Reilly, 1980). What
was unexpected, however, was that the board be-
came overwhelmed with information relatively
quickly after a change in composition. Research on
team composition and membership change would
suggest that those informational effects emerge over
time and as a result of poor interpersonal processes
(Srikanth et al., 2016). Finally, decision diversion
is similar to satisficing (Simon, 1957). However,
rather than choosing an acceptable alternative in-
stead of an optimal alternative, the board in our
study chose to respond to an overwhelming amount
of information and complexity of information by
shifting its attention to pursuing entirely different
goals.
Boundaries of the Study
Our empirical findings, and the process resulting
from them, provide a window into how team dy-
namics may unfold following a change in team com-
position. The nature of the team in our study,
a corporate board, was critical to enabling us to ex-
amine those dynamics. The team underwent several
changes in composition specifically to dealwith poor
4 These dynamics are represented by grey circles in
Figure 2. External pressure increased over time, whereas
informational and status dynamics lessened.
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organizational performance; the team was therefore
well positioned to benefit from diverse information
and interests. That allowed us to examine how dy-
namics described in previous literature could unfold,
and specifically, how that process was triggered by
a change in composition.
However, changes in team composition also bound
our findings in two importantways. First, our findings
are more likely to apply in those contexts in which
team composition is altered to improve poor team
performance than in contexts where team composi-
tion is changed during times of good performance.
Teams that change composition during periods of
good performance seem less likely to exhibit the same
pattern.We speculate that changing compositionmay
also be less likely in that context. Second, our findings
are more likely to apply to situations in which new
members are relatively high in status, take on a high
status role in the team, or belong to a subgroup than
situations where a single low status team member
joins the team. When lone newmembers who are not
high in status join a team, they are more likely to
conform to the team’s decisions, which would not
trigger the dynamics we observed. In general, we are
not able to disentangle the effects of external context,
informational dynamics, and status dynamics from
compositionaleffects inourdata;wecanonlydescribe
the processes we observed in the presence of these
dynamics.
Given our emphasis, several other factors are not in-
cluded in the decision diversion framework. For exam-
ple, although our framework has implications for the
effects of diversifying teams, these implications are sepa-
rate from how the amount of diversity on the team (e.g.,
proportion of women) affects firm performance. Further-
more, although we consider how board decisions sus-
tained the firm versus exacerbated the firm’s financial
distress, our data do not allow us to be decisive in
identifying the financial outcomes of specific board de-
cisions, nor can we pinpoint which decisions were pri-
marily responsible for the firm’s eventual bankruptcy.
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING
CHANGES IN TEAM COMPOSITION
Our study began with the observation that the ad-
vice to change team composition to improve team
decision-making is implied by the team diversity
literature. Literatures on team diversity, subgroups,
and team turnover suggest that changing team com-
position may disrupt team interpersonal processes
but should improve team information processing.
Our findings are consistent with previous diversity
research that finds both informational and in-
terpersonal effects of diversity on team performance
(Milliken & Martins, 1996; van Knippenberg &
Schippers, 2007). Over the long term, both infor-
mation processing and interpersonal relations in
the board in our study becameproblematic. However,
we also observed an alternative process through
which those effects may occur, thereby offering
new directions for research. We summarize our
key discoveries in Table 3.
Challenging Assumptions and New Directions
for Research
Emergence of interpersonal and subgroup
dynamics.Much existing literature portrays diverse
teams as characterized by a high degree of conflict
and a lack of genuine, task-focused communication
(van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007; Williams &
O’Reilly, 1998). In teams with subgroups, team dy-
namics can be even more dysfunctional (Lau &
Murnighan, 2005;Li&Hambrick,2005). Interpersonal
attraction and subgroup formation are expected to
occur quickly after the formation of a team (Brewer,
1979) and are viewed as problems to overcome to
achieve outstanding performance. Although we ob-
served that individual team members on the board
we studied pursued personal and subgroup agendas
through the application of interpersonal tactics
including conflict, those attempts often occurred
in isolation and were typically quashed by the
board. We suggest that, whereas the behaviors
of individual team members may be well described
by existing research on diversity and subgroups,
further research is necessary to explain how those
individual behaviors translate into team dynamics.
Our findings reveal a more gradual emergence of
poor interpersonal processes over time. Initially,
team members used one another’s affiliations as
a way to understand their interests and positions,
consistent with the notion that salient surface level
TABLE 3
Summary of Discoveries
Summary of Prior Research Our Discovery
Interpersonal conflict and
sub-group dynamics are
at the root of problems for
diverse teams and changes
in team composition
Interpersonal conflict and sub-
group dynamics emerged









making is at the root of some
diverse team problems
Attempting to understand
and integrate one another’s
perspectives leads to
effective decision-making
Attempting to understand and
integrate one another’s
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differences between team members can signal the
presence of deeper level differences in informa-
tion and perspective (Phillips et al., 2004; Rink &
Ellemers, 2006). One explanation for that effect
is that members of diverse teams are less focused
on building relationships with one another (Loyd
et al., 2013). We similarly observed a strong task
focus immediately following changes in board
composition. Interpersonal problems occurred after
a breakdown in task-based information processing.
This opens up the question of how researchers
should conceptualize the order of the informational
versus interpersonal effects of diversity over time
and adds to recent calls to more closely examine the
role of time in diverse teams (Harrison, Price, & Bell,
1998; Mohammed & Harrison, 2013; Srikanth et al.,
2016). In particular, we highlight two questions for
further research. One question is what are the im-
mediate effects of a change in team composition on
information processing in teams? In particular, re-
search in this vein may examine how dimensions of
a team’s task, including urgency and importance,
may influence information processing. A second
question is how do those effects influence the
emergence of interpersonal effects over time? That
research should consider how failures in decision
making, or failures to make decisions, may shape
subsequent interpersonal interactions.
Information as a root of problems after changes
in team composition. In our study, the diversity of
perspectives represented on the board, and their as-
sociated information processing demands, emerged
as the heart of poor decision-making. The primary
failing of the team in our study was one of in-
formation analysis and decision-making – the board
ended up preserving decision efficiency (i.e., the
tendency to reach some type of decision, in fact, any
type of decision) at the expense of decision quality
(as defined by focusing on the firm’s financial via-
bility). This finding stands in contrast to the domi-
nant model of diversity, which views informational
problems as resulting from interpersonal dynamics.
Our findings are consistent with emerging evidence
that it is challenging for diverse teams to effectively
integrate the information that team members bring
to deliberations information (Dahlin et al., 2005;
Srikanth et al., 2016).
The challenge of integrating information in the
context of status instability and external pressure
often led to difficulty in reaching a decision. Failure
to make decisions has generally been overlooked as
a source of difficulty for diverse teams (Denis,
Dompierre, Langley, & Rouleau, 2011; Nijstad &
Kaps, 2008). Our study demonstrates how failure to
reach decisions may provide an opportunity for an
alternative basis for decision-making to arise. In
doing so, our study opens up a series of avenues for
further research. It raises the question of what types
of obstacles to effective decision making occur as
a result of diversity. Specifically, how does the con-
tent of team members’ interests and opinions com-
bine to create obstacles?Our research calls for further
attention to the process through which diverse teams
choose which goals to pursue and in particular, how
they can become diverted away from high-level,
broad, important goals to focus on smaller, more
manageable problems. It also suggests that further re-
search is needed on how teams can effectively cope
with large amounts of complex information.
One key issue within that process is the role of
leadership. Leaders may play a critical role in keep-
ing diverse teams on track. How might effective
leadership of diverse teams with changing com-
position differ from more traditional leadership
models? Our findings suggest that the participative,
inclusive form of leadership that is often advocated
as beneficial for team performance (e.g., Edmondson,
1999) may be less effective for diverse teams facing
high levels of informational complexity and exter-
nal pressure. In that context, effective leadership
may require directing a team’s attention towards core
goals, which may entail limiting participation on
some issues. A key question for future research is:
how can leaders help diverse teams to maintain
their focus on distal but important goals? Further,
research may consider whether leaders’ effective-
ness at achieving that task can be monitored, par-
ticularly within the context of a corporate board.
Perils of understanding and integrating
perspectives. In our study, it was the team’s at-
tempt to act inpursuit of performanceon the task that
led to decision diversion. This stands in contrast to
the widely held belief that diversity benefits groups
when members explore and accept alternative per-
spectives (Ely & Thomas, 2001; Hambrick, 2007; van
Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Instead, we build
on a developing view that in some cases it is un-
necessary andeven suboptimal for groupmembers to
resolve their underlying differences (e.g., Gillespie,
2011; Majchrzak et al., 2012). Sub-group interest ne-
gotiating enabled team members and sub-groups in
ourstudytoresolvedifferences,yetbecause itprovided
a more straightforward basis for decision-making, it
allowedthe teamtoreplace theircoregoalof improving
the firm’s financial health with sub-goals that moved
them increasingly further away from that core goal.
Our study reveals issue negotiating as a third
possible path to team decision-making. Previous
research may have characterized issue negotiating
as either a decision-making process or an inter-
personal process, but we describe it as a distinct
process because it is neither an attempt to make
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a good decision in the service of task performance,
nor a political process in which team members at-
tempt to pursue their own sub-group agendas.
Similarly, it differs from satisficing (Simon, 1957),
in that it is not a choice to accept a sub-optimal
alternative. Rather than poor decision-making, is-
sue negotiating emerges because a team chooses
the wrong type of decision to make. Yet, the de-
cisions a team makes while issue negotiating are
still attempts to serve the team task rather than team
members’ own personal agendas. Research on goal
displacement (Kerr, 1975; Merton, 1957) similarly
suggests that intangible high-level organizational
goals can become subordinated tomore proximal and
measurable goals when decision-makers need to act
and become frustrated with abstract goals (Warner &
Havens, 1968). In our study, the board viewed re-
solving sub-group interests as steps on the path to-
wards their core goal. However, pursuing those steps
ultimately diverted them from that core goal.
Our study suggests several directions for future re-
search in this area. One is to consider the conditions
under which understanding and integrating perspec-
tivesmay be helpful versus detrimental for diverse team
performance. How does the precise team composition
influencethatbalance?Forexample,perhapsintegrating
perspectives becomes problematic when team mem-
bers’ interests are too divergent.Alternatively, howdoes
the decision-making context influence that process? In-
tegrating perspectives may become more challenging
when teams are under extreme pressure. Finally, per-
haps some processes are effective for integrating per-
spectives whereas others are not. Therefore, another
important question for further research is to examine
how diverse teams can resolve differences in interests
without diverting attention away from core goals.
CONCLUSION
In unraveling the precise processes throughwhich
changing team composition influences team in-
teractions, we have identified dynamics that may be
counter-intuitive in light of traditional social psy-
chological research on group and interpersonal pro-
cesses. Importantly, it is the combination of adding
new members, in the context of poor team perfor-
mance and when decisions are important and urgent
that leads to decision diversion in our model. That
implies that a natural limit may exist to the effective-
ness of manipulating team composition as a mecha-
nism for improving decision-making because any
turnover that occurs during periods of poor perfor-
mancemay lead to, or exacerbate, decision diversion.
Decisiondiversionwas revealedbystudyinga team’s
continuous interactions over time in a real field set-
ting. Indecision, subgroup dynamics, and boardroom
interactions are difficult to assess through post hoc
survey, interview, or archival research. Clearly, those
methods are indispensable, yet the phenomena thatwe
have highlighted in this study have underscored the
advantages of direct observation to more fully un-
derstand teamprocesses. Our research indicates a need
to consider the dynamic processes throughwhich team
composition influences decision-making, rather how it
operates as a fixed input into decisions.
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APPENDIX A
Content Analysis
Verbal Behavior Categories Examples
Task-focused Comments
Information giving “The new kill-line is up and we are now at 60 hogs an hour.”
Information seeking “When is the final stock purchase?”
Making specific suggestions for action “I want a letter from RP (company lawyer) which says that Mr. X will have to pay up or
they’ll be pulled into court.”
Sensible, nonpersonal arguments “To get out of the dependence on the cut-out, we have to use all possible parts of the hog
and turn everything we can into processed meat”
Corporate interests “We (the company and the union) should go down to the IRS and argue this out—they
should not stop us now.”
Sub-group Interest-based Comments
Special interest group gains and
positions
In a discussion about a union concession, an employee director says, “Don’t roll back the
pension. Don’t tamper with the pension, because that’ll undo morale.”
Attempts to propose new board topics In the middle of a discussion about wildcat strikes, a director gets annoyed and says, “I
want us to get to the issue of compensation and can we cut out all this rhetoric?”
Affective Conflict Comments
Personal defensiveness CEO (whining) “Everything we do here is being held up by the PBGC not signing.”
Personal gains Director of sales andmarketing (a boardmember) recounting how all the competitors are
underselling and losing money says, “But we [sales and marketing] have gotten two
new large orders [he describes them], which is a breakthrough for the company.”
Disagreements, conflicts, attacks In a discussion about poor first-line supervision, the personnel director explains that
some line supervisors were hired off the Coca-Cola bottling plant, and a director turns
on him and says, “How on earth could we hire someone from Coca-Cola and not train
him?”
Stonewalling Director to the CEO: “When will you start to negotiate?” (Referring to a master union
agreement, a controversial issue.) CEO does not respond and instead asks the





Making statements in support of
another person’s argument
One director: “For heaven’s sake, don’t give him a title; he has to do it his way.”
Chairman: “I agree.”
Agreeing reluctantly Following a discussion about whether some product cost reductions have been passed
on to sales, the CEO finally admits that it has been passed on to the salesman, although
he said “No it hasn’t” initially.
Tension management “. . .LT and HE are doing a good job, and we should encourage that and ask them to keep
going.”
Direction of traffic The CEO asks the board chairman to move to agenda item #10: health insurance.
Collective spirit and solidarity moves CEO, addressing the local union officers, those who are present on the board, and the
board itself: “We’re all in the same boat now; we’ll have to pull together.”
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